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The Effect of Analyst Coverage on the Informativeness  
of Income Smoothing 
 
 
Abstract 
           This study examines whether analyst coverage affects the informativeness of 
income smoothing.  I find that income smoothing enhances earnings informativeness 
more greatly for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst 
coverage.  The results suggest that income smoothing more efficiently communicates 
private information to investors when firms are followed by more analysts, consistent 
with the notion that analysts play an important information intermediary role in 
enhancing the informativeness of income smoothing. 
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1.        Introduction 
           There are two underlying motivations for income smoothing, a unique type of 
earnings management (Tucker & Zarowin, 2006).  First, managers may smooth earnings 
to efficiently communicate private information about future earnings to investors, i.e., 
informativeness of income smoothing.  Tucker and Zarowin (2006) document strong 
evidence on the positive association between income smoothing and earnings 
informativeness, suggesting that income smoothing is an important way for managers to 
communicate private information.   Second, managers may smooth earnings to 
intentionally distort financial performance for their opportunistic purposes, i.e., 
opportunism of income smoothing.  This argument is also supported by previous studies 
(e.g., Healy, 1985; Watts & Zimmerman, 1990).   
           Analysts play an important information intermediary role in capital markets.  On 
the one hand, analysts can search for private information and communicate private 
information to investors.  On the other hand, analysts can interpret public information to 
investors.  Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2009) find evidence on both analysts’ private 
information discovery role and public information interpretation role.  Analysts’ 
information interpretation role may help investors to use information signaled by 
managers.  Given that managers communicate private information via income smoothing, 
the interpretation role may reinforce the informativeness of income smoothing.  
Moreover, analysts’ information discovery role may enhance the oversight of financial 
reporting.  Yu (2008) finds that high analyst coverage is associated with a low level of 
discretionary accruals, suggesting that analyst coverage may play a monitoring role in 
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constraining managerial opportunism.  Given that analysts’ information discovery role 
can constrain opportunistic income smoothing, the discovery role will also enhance the 
informativeness of income smoothing.  Taken together, both information interpretation 
and discovery roles suggest that analyst coverage may be positively associated with the 
informativeness of income smoothing.   
           However, the positive association between analyst coverage and the 
informativeness of income smoothing could be challenged by analysts’ information 
discovery role itself.  Since analysts can acquire and communicate private information, 
companies may have a low demand for using income smoothing to signal information 
when they are followed by more analysts.   This may lead to a negative effect of analyst 
coverage on the informativeness of income smoothing.  It is unclear whether the positive 
(negative) effect of analysts’ information interpretation (discovery) role on the 
informativeness (opportunism) of income smoothing is offset by the negative effect of 
analysts’ information  discovery role on the informativeness of income smoothing.  Thus, 
it is worth documenting empirical evidence on the net effect of analyst coverage on the 
informativeness of income smoothing. 
           To shed light on the relationship between analyst coverage and the underlying 
motive for smoothing earnings, this study examines the effect of analyst coverage on the 
informativeness of income smoothing.  Based on analysts’ information discovery and 
interpretation roles, I argue that analyst coverage is positively associated with the 
informativeness of income smoothing.  However, this argument is also challenged by 
analysts’ information discovery role.  To investigate this empirical issue, I employ the 
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Tucker and Zarowin (2006) approach to measure the informativeness of income 
smoothing.  Using a sample of 4,730 firm-year observations, I find that income 
smoothing enhances earnings informativeness more greatly for firms with high analyst 
coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage, consistent with the argument of the 
positive effect of analyst coverage on the informativeness of income smoothing.  The 
results hold after controlling for the endogeneity of analyst coverage.  These findings 
suggest that income smoothing more efficiently communicates private information to 
investors when firms are followed by more analysts, consistent with the notion that 
analysts play an important intermediary role in enhancing the informativeness of income 
smoothing. 
             Ayers and Freeman (2003) find that analyst coverage positively affects the 
association between stock returns and future earnings.  Their results suggest that high 
analyst coverage may lead to high credibility of accounting numbers as the association 
between stock returns and future earnings may reflect the credibility of accounting 
earnings.  Unlike Ayers and Freeman (2003), this study examines the effect of analyst 
coverage on the association between stock returns and the interaction of income 
smoothing and future earnings.  Since the association between stock returns and the 
interaction of income smoothing and future earnings measures the extent to which 
income smoothing can signal private information about future earnings (Tucker & 
Zarowin, 2006), this study’s results more directly reflect the effect of analyst coverage on 
the informativeness or  “credibility” of  income smoothing rather than the credibility of 
accounting numbers.   
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           This study contributes to the literature in the following two ways.  First, this study 
extends the research on analysts’ information intermediary role by examining the effect 
of analyst coverage on the informativeness of income smoothing.  Analysts’ 
interpretation role may strengthen the signaling function of income smoothing, while 
their information discovery role may constrain opportunistic income smoothing and thus 
enhance the informativeness of income smoothing.  However, analysts’ information 
discovery role may reduce companies’ demand for communicating private information 
via income smoothing and then weaken the informativeness of income smoothing.  
Hence, it is warranted to make clear whether analyst coverage positively affects the 
informativeness of income smoothing.  This study provides empirical evidence that 
analysts’ intermediary role leads to more efficient income smoothing.  Second, this study 
also adds to the literature on the informativeness of earnings management by focusing on 
analyst coverage.  Prior research (e.g., Subramanyam, 1996; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006) 
mainly examines whether earnings management is informative about future earnings.  To 
the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to investigate whether analyst coverage 
affects the informativeness of income smoothing.  This study suggests that the 
informativeness of income smoothing is affected by firms’ information environment or 
corporate governance.  
           The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 introduces 
background and develops the hypothesis.  Section 3 discusses research design.  Section 4 
presents empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
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2.        Background and hypothesis 
2.1.     Informativeness and opportunism of income smoothing  
           Like other types of earnings management, income smoothing can be classified by 
two different managerial motivations: (1) “informative” income smoothing, and (2) 
“opportunistic” income smoothing.  Informative income smoothing means that managers 
have incentives to smooth earnings to communicate private information about future 
earnings to investors.   If income smoothing is informative, information about future 
earnings can be reflected in smoothed current earnings and thereafter stock prices.  
Sankar and Subramanyam (2001) theoretically investigate the managerial motivation for 
income smoothing by showing that managers use income smoothing as a vehicle to 
communicate their private information about future earnings.  Subramanyam (1996) finds 
that discretionary accruals are positively associated with stock returns, future earnings, 
and operating cash flows, suggesting that discretionary accruals may communicate 
information about future benefits.  Hunt, Moyer, and Shevlin (2000) use the 
contemporaneous price-earnings relation to measure earnings informativeness and 
document that the price-earnings relation is positively associated with income smoothing.  
These studies support the notion that income smoothing can enhance earnings 
informativeness.   
           Recently, Tucker and Zarowin (2006) refine the measurement of earnings 
informativeness by using the association between current-year stock returns and future 
earnings, i.e., future earnings response coefficient.  They justify this proxy for earnings 
informativeness by arguing that all information communicated via income smoothing can 
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be impounded in current stock prices, but some of which cannot be captured by current 
earnings.  Using this measurement, they document strong evidence that earnings 
informativeness is positively associated with the extent to which firms smooth earnings.  
This suggests that income smoothing plays an informative role in communicating private 
information about future earnings. 
           As opposed to informative income smoothing, opportunistic income smoothing 
means that managers are motivated to smooth earnings not for the efficient 
communication of their private information but for their private purposes (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990; Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  If income smoothing is opportunistic, 
smoothed earnings are more likely to be garbled and thus become less informative about 
future earnings.  Healy (1985) and Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) investigate the 
relationship between managerial reporting behavior and bonus schemes.  They find that 
managers use accruals to defer income for firms with caps on bonus awards when that 
cap is reached, suggesting that managers use accounting discretion to increase their bonus 
awards.  Prior research (e.g., DeAngelo, 1988; Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Fudenberg & 
Tirole, 1995) also suggests that managers manipulate earnings when job security is 
threatened or their expected tenure with the firm is short.  These studies are consistent 
with the argument that income smoothing is opportunistic.  In summary, income 
smoothing may bring about not only benefits (informativeness) but also costs 
(opportunism).  
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2.2.     Information intermediary role of analysts 
           Analysts play an information intermediary role by producing information to 
explore or supplement financial reporting (Healy & Palepu, 2001).  One aspect of 
analysts’ information intermediary role is to search for private information and 
communicate it to investors by issuing forecasts, ratings, and research reports.  Another 
aspect of analysts’ information intermediary role is to interpret public information to 
investors.  There is a large body of research that examines the information intermediary 
role of analysts.  For example, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) and Lys and Sohn (1990) 
document evidence on the market reaction to the release of analyst reports, suggesting 
that analyst coverage is informative.  Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) find a negative 
association between analyst coverage and the profitability of momentum strategies.  
Thus, information about firms with high analyst coverage is more likely to be available to 
the investing public.  
           Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) investigate the relation between analyst 
coverage and intangible assets.  They find that analyst coverage is greater for firms with 
more intangible assets, suggesting that analysts have incentives to acquire private 
information when there is more information asymmetry between managers and investors, 
or more inherent uncertainty about firm value.  Ayers and Freeman (2003) examine 
whether analyst following affects the pricing of future earnings, and find that prices of 
firms with high analyst coverage incorporate future earnings earlier than prices of firms 
with low analyst coverage.  Using insider trading profits as a proxy for the information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors, Frankel and Li (2004) find that 
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analyst following is negatively associated with insider trading profits.  Chen, Cheng, and 
Lo (2009) find that an accurate analyst earnings forecast can pre-empt the information 
content of a quarterly earnings announcement, while an informative earnings 
announcement with precise forward looking information can pre-empt information in 
subsequent analyst reports.  Their results suggest that analyst coverage plays not only an 
information discovery role but also an information interpretation role.1   
           Lang and Lundholm (1993) find that analyst coverage increases in corporate 
disclosure, suggesting that managerial disclosure may positively affect analyst coverage.  
However, Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that “the effect of voluntary disclosure on 
demand for analysts’ services is ambiguous” because “public voluntary disclosure also 
pre-empts analysts’ ability to distribute managers’ private information to investors, 
leading to a decline in demand for their services” (Healy & Palepu 2001, pp. 417).  
Moreover, Lang and Lundholm (1993) focus on the effect of voluntary disclosure on 
analyst coverage rather than the effect of analyst coverage on voluntary disclosure.  There 
is rare research that examines the effect of analyst coverage on voluntary disclosure.  
This study implicitly addresses this unclear issue.  Analysts’ information interpretation 
role may increase managers’ incentive to disclose private information as the disclosed 
information can be effectively communicated to investors via analysts, while analysts’ 
information discovery role may reduce managers’ demand for disclosing private 
information because analysts might have acquired that information.  
                                                 
1
            Previous studies also suggest that there are some behavior biases in analysts’ production of 
information (e.g., Lin & McNichols, 1998; Hong, Kubik, & Solomon, 2000; Clarke & Subramanian, 2006; 
Bernhardt, Campello, & Kutsoati, 2006). 
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           Analysts’ information intermediary role may have governance aspect.  Analysts’ 
information discovery role suggests that they have incentives to acquire private 
information and scrutinize firms’ public disclosure to secure their good job performance, 
thereby playing an important role in monitoring firms’ financial reporting.  Analysts have 
great experience on tracking corporate financial statements and substantial industry-wide 
knowledge, which can help them effectively monitor financial reporting process, e.g., by 
interacting directly with management and raising questions through earnings release 
conferences.  Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2008) find that analysts are more effective in 
the discovery of corporate fraud than the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
auditors are, suggesting that analyst coverage is an important alternative governance 
mechanism.  Analyst coverage can act as a magnifying lens of managerial opportunism, 
which allows less informed shareholders and outside directors to impose discipline on 
value destroying managers.  Thus, analyst following may increase firms’ overall 
governance quality.  Recently, Yu (2008) and Knyazeva (2007) find that earnings 
management is lower for firms with high analyst coverage than for firm with low analyst 
coverage, suggesting that analyst coverage may constrain managerial opportunism. 
            
2.3.     Hypothesis 
           Analysts can interpret public information to investors because they posses superior 
information processing abilities.  Analysts have better knowledge and experience on 
companies and industries so that they can help investors to understand the private 
information communicated via income smoothing.  Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2009) argue 
that analysts often discuss the effect of changes in accounting methods, the effect of 
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nonrecurring charges, and the implication of changes in corporate strategy for future 
performance in many of their reports.  Therefore, analysts’ interpretation role can 
facilitate investors to use information disclosed in earnings announcements and financial 
reports.  When managers communicate private information via income smoothing, 
analysts will interpret that information to investors.  Ayers and Freeman (2003) suggest 
that stock prices of companies with more analyst coverage may incorporate more 
information from analysts.  Thus, more private information communicated via income 
smoothing will be incorporated in stock prices when firms are followed by more analysts, 
given that income smoothing is informative.  
           Moreover, analysts’ information discovery may serve a monitoring role in 
financial reporting.  For firms with high analyst coverage, managers are more likely to be 
questioned for their opportunistic behavior when analysts have truthful information, and 
will be more difficult to engage in opportunistic income smoothing.  Strong governance 
resulting from high analyst coverage may lead to less managerial opportunism and more 
oversight of financial reporting (Lang, Raedy, & Wilson, 2006; Yu, 2008; Knyazeva, 
2007).  The governance role of analyst coverage curtails managerial opportunism and 
thus enlarges the informative role of accounting discretion.  Thus, I argue that analyst 
coverage may be positively associated with the informativeness of income smoothing 
given that analysts’ information discovery role can enhance the oversight of financial 
reporting and thus reduce opportunistic income smoothing.  Based on the above 
arguments of the positive (negative) effect of analysts’ information discovery 
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(interpretation) role on the informative (opportunistic) part of income smoothing, I 
develop the hypothesis as follows: 
H1.  Analyst coverage is associated with the informativeness of income smoothing. 
           However, the hypothesis is also challenged by analysts’ information discovery 
role.  Since analysts can search for and communicate private information to investors, 
much “private” information about future earnings has become “public” when firms are 
followed by more analysts.  Even though the signaling costs through accounting 
discretion are not high and managers always have incentives to signal private 
information, firms with high analyst coverage may have less private information to signal 
via income smoothing than firms with low analyst coverage.  The proportion of 
informative income smoothing may be lower for firms with high analyst coverage than 
for firms with low analyst coverage.  Thus, analysts’ information discovery role may 
reduce companies’ demand for communicating private information via income 
smoothing.  It is warranted to document empirical evidence on the net effect of analyst 
coverage on the informativeness of income smoothing. 
 
3.        Research design 
3.1.     Sample selection 
           The sample selection begins with the data from the 2006 version of Compustat’s 
industrial annual data file and the IRRC database.2  I identify 1996-2002 as the sample 
period for testing the hypothesis.  I choose 1996 as the first year of the period because the 
data of directors are not available for years before 1996 in this version of the IRRC 
                                                 
2
          The IRRC database provides the data of directors.  
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database.  The sample period ends in 2002 because I use the future three years’ earnings 
and stock returns to implement the Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1994) approach 
for gauging earnings informativeness.  To compute discretionary accruals, I exclude all 
observations from a two-digit SIC industry that contains less than eight observations.  I 
also delete observations from the financial and regulated industries (SIC 4000-4999 and 
6000-6999) and observations with missing data.  Then, the data set is merged with the 
I/B/E/S detail file from which analyst coverage is computed.  After excluding 
observations with missing data from the CRSP database, the final sample consists of 
4,730 firm-year observations over the period 1996 to 2002.  Table 1 reports the 
breakdown of the sample by industry.  The sample firms distribute across 38 two-digit 
SIC industries, of which electrical and electronic equipment (10.70%), chemicals and 
allied products (10.27%), business services (9.26%), industrial machinery and equipment 
(8.69%), and instruments and related products (6.07%) are the most widely represented 
industries in the sample.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE    
 
3.2.     Measurement of income smoothing              
            To compute discretionary accruals, I first estimate the following cross-sectional 
variant of the modified Jones model using observations within each two-digit SIC 
industry-year: 
         ACC/TA
-1 = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 ∆SALES/TA-1 + a2 PPE/TA-1 + a3 ROA + ε           (1) 
where  
          ACC = total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before  
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                      extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash flow from  
                      operations, 
          TA
-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year, 
   ∆SALES = change in sales between year t-1 and year t, 
         PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment, 
         ROA = return on assets.  
          After estimating parameters in model (1), I measure the discretionary accruals as 
the residual values of the regression.  The pre-discretionary income is measured as net 
income minus discretionary accruals.  Second, I compute the correlation between change 
in discretionary accruals and change in pre-discretionary income using the current year 
and past four years’ observations.  This correlation coefficient reflects income smoothing 
as a negative correlation indicates that managers use discretionary accruals to make the 
reported series of earnings smooth (Myers, Myers, & Skinner, 2007; Leuz, Nanda, & 
Wysocki, 2003).  Like Tucker and Zarowin (2006), income smoothing (IS) is measured 
as a firm’s reversed fractional ranking of the correlation coefficient within its two-digit 
SIC industry-year. 
 
3.3.     Earnings informativeness and informative role of income smoothing  
           Tucker and Zarowin (2006) investigate whether income smoothing improves 
earnings informativeness using the benchmark model of earnings informativeness 
originated from the model that Collins et al. (1994) employ to examine how much 
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information about future earnings is reflected in current stock returns.3  Based on Tucker 
and Zarowin (2006), I measure earnings informativeness using the following panel 
regression model:4  
              Rt = b0 + b1Xt-1 + b2Xt + b3Xt3 + b4Rt3 + b5BETAt  + εt                                   (2) 
where  
             Rt  = the ex-dividend stock return in year t, 
            Xt-1 = the split-adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items in year t-1,   
                     deflated by the stock price at the beginning of year t,  
            Xt   = the split-adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items in year t,   
                     deflated by the stock price at the beginning of year t,  
            Xt3  = the sum of split-adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items in  
                     years t+1, t+2, and t+3, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of year t,  
            Rt3  = the annually compounded stock return for years t+1 through t+3. 
      BETAt = the slope coefficient of a regression of monthly stock returns on equally  
                    weighted market returns in year t. 
            I include BETAt in the model to control for the effect of market risk on stock 
returns.  In model (2), the coefficient on Xt3 measures the extent to which the information 
about future earnings is reflected in current stock price.  A higher coefficient on Xt3 
indicates higher earnings informativeness.   
                                                 
3
            I focus on Tucker and Zarowin’s (2006) approach because they argue that this approach is superior. 
4
            The panel regression model is a two-way (firm and year) fixed effect model, which controls for 
serial correlation. For comparison, I also provide the results of the main test without having regression with 
fixed effects in the appendix.  
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            Like Tucker and Zarowin (2006), I expand model (2) by including IS and the 
interactions between IS and earnings and stock returns variables:  
            Rt = b0 + b1Xt-1 + b2Xt + b3Xt3 + b4Rt3 + b5BETAt + b6ISt + b7 ISt * Xt-1 + b8 ISt * Xt  
                         
+ b9 ISt * Xt3  + b10 ISt * Rt3  + εt                                                                                          (3) 
where  ISt  is income smoothing.        
            In the panel regression model (3), the efficient on ISt * Xt3  reflects the 
informativeness of income smoothing, i.e., the extent to which income smoothing 
enhances earnings informativeness (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006).  A significant and 
positive coefficient on ISt * Xt3  will suggest a significant improvement in earnings 
informativeness through income smoothing.   
 
3.4.     Hypothesis testing  
           I run the panel regression to test the hypothesis.  Model (3) is expanded by 
including analyst coverage, its interactions with Xt3  and ISt * Xt3, and several control 
variables:
 
5
  
            Rt = b0 + b1Xt-1 + b2Xt + b3Xt3 + b4Rt3 + b5BETAt +b6ISt + b7 ISt * Xt-1 + b8 ISt * Xt  
                         
+ b9 ISt * Xt3  + b10 ISt * Rt3 + b11ANALYSTt+ b12ANALYSTt *ISt 
                         
+ b13ANALYSTt *Xt3  + b14 ANALYSTt * ISt * Xt3  + b15BDINDt + b16BDINDt *ISt    
                        
+ b17BDINDt *Xt3 + b18 BDINDt * ISt * Xt3 + b19 SIZEt + b20 SIZEt*Xt3  + b21BM t  
                        
+ b22 BM t *Xt3  + b23EARNSTD t + b24EARNSTD t *Xt3 + b25LOSS t  
                        
+ b26LOSS t*Xt3  + εt                                                                                                                      (4)                 
where  
                                                 
5
            The continuous variables in the models are winsorized at 1% and 99%.  
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   ANALYSTt = analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts who issued earnings  
                        forecasts (Yu, 2008),  
       BDINDt = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors  
 
                        on the board, 
 
           SIZEt = firm size, measured as the market value of common equity,  
 
           BM
 t   = book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of common  
                       equity to market value of common equity,  
 EARNSTDt = future earnings variability, measured as the standard deviation of earnings  
                       per share adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends for years t+1 to t+3,  
                       deflated by the stock price at the beginning of year t,  
        LOSS
 t = dummy variable, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise.  
           In model (4), the coefficient on the three-way interaction term, i.e., ANALYSTt * 
ISt * Xt3, will be positive and significant if the argument of the positive effect of analyst 
coverage on the informativeness of income smoothing is supported, but will be negative 
and significant if the argument of the negative effect of analyst coverage on the 
informativeness of income smoothing is supported.  Klein (2002) and Vafeas (2005) 
suggest that independent directors are more effective in constraining opportunistic 
earnings management.  Thus, we include board independence and its interaction with ISt 
* Xt3 in the model to control for the effect of board independence on the informativeness 
of income smoothing.  I expect a positive coefficient on BDINDt * ISt * Xt3.  In model (4), 
I also include firm size, the book-to-market ratio, future earnings variability, and loss-
making indicator, and their interactions with Xt3 because Tucker and Zarowin (2006) find 
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that those factors are associated with earnings informativeness.  Based on Tucker and 
Zarowin (2006), the coefficients are expected to be positive for SIZEt*Xt3 and BM t *Xt3, 
and be negative for EARNSTD
 t *Xt3 and LOSS t*Xt3.  
           In addition, I test the hypothesis by allowing for the endogenous relationship 
between analyst coverage and earnings quality.  Analysts may be more likely to cover 
firms with high earnings quality (Yu, 2008).  Thus, it is likely that analyst coverage is 
affected by earnings quality, which also affects the informativeness of income smoothing.  
I use the past four years’ average analyst coverage as an instrumental variable because 
income smoothing is a multi-year activity and the monitoring of analysts may come from 
an average level of analyst coverage during these years.  To address this concern, I run 
the two-stage panel regression.  I estimate the first stage model as follows: 
    ANALYSTt =a0 + a1PAST t + a2 SIZEt + a3ROA t -1 + a4GROWTH t + a5EXTFIN t + εt    (5) 
where 
        PAST
 t = past four years’ average analyst coverage, 
       ROA
 t -1 = lagged return on assets, 
 GROWTH
 t = growth rate of assets, measured as the change in total assets deflated by the  
                        beginning-of-year total assets,  
EXTFIN
 t = external financing, measured as net cash proceeds from equity and debt  
                   financing deflated by total assets. 
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           Firm size, past earnings performance, growth, and external financing are included 
in model (5) because those firm characteristics may affect analyst coverage (Yu, 2008).6  
I run the second stage regression model, i.e., model (4), using the fitted value 
(ANALYSTt_F) from model (5) to replace ANALYSTt in model (4).           
 
4.        Empirical results 
           Table 2 tabulates the descriptive statistics of the 4,730 sample observations.  The 
first six rows list the variables used in implementing the model to measure earnings 
informativeness.  The other rows contain the additional variables used in testing the 
hypothesis.  The mean and median of analyst coverage are 12.48 and 10.00, respectively, 
while the mean and median of board independence are 61.3% and 62.5%. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
           Table 3 reports the Pearson correlations between the independent variables used in 
model (4).   The current earnings per share is negatively correlated with the loss-making 
dummy (r= -0.67).7  The maximum absolute value among the other correlation 
coefficients is 0.47 between Xt and Xt-1.  Overall, the correlations among the independent 
variables are not extremely high.  Thus, it is less likely that multicollinearity is a 
substantive issue in this study.   
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
           Table 4 presents the results on earnings informativeness and the informative role 
                                                 
6
           Yu (2008) also includes cash flow volatility in his model, but finds no significant coefficient on this 
variable. The results are not qualitatively changed if cash flow volatility is also included in model (5) of 
this study.  
7
            I find similar results if LOSSt is excluded from the models to eliminate the possible 
multicollinearity resulted from the high correlation between LOSSt and Xt.   
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of income smoothing.  In Table 4, columns 3 and 4, I document that current stock returns 
are positively associated with current earnings and aggregate three years ahead earnings 
(t-statistic = 15.43 and 11.51, respectively), and negatively associated with lagged 
earnings and cumulative three years ahead stock returns (t-statistic = -9.91 and -7.57).  I 
also find that stock returns are positively associated with market risk.  Table 4, columns 5 
and 6 show that the coefficient on ISt *Xt3 is positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.99), 
consistent with Tucker and Zarowin (2006).   The results suggest that income smoothing 
plays an important role in enhancing earnings informativeness.   
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
           Table 5 reports the results on testing the hypothesis.  I find a positive and 
significant coefficient on the three-way interaction term, i.e., ANALYSTt *ISt *Xt3 (t-
statistic = 2.35), consistent with the argument of the positive effect of analyst coverage on 
the informativeness of income smoothing.  Thus, income smoothing enhances earnings 
informativeness more greatly for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with 
low analyst coverage.  This also suggests that analyst coverage serves an intermediary 
role in improving information interpretation and a corporate governance role in reducing 
accounting manipulation.  In addition, I find that earnings informativeness is lower for 
firms with high book-to-market ratio, high future earnings variability, and negative 
earnings. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
           A concern with the results in Table 5 is that the potential endogeneity of analyst 
coverage is not allowed for.  Analysts may be more likely to self-select firms in which 
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accounting discretion is more informative about future earnings.  I use the two-stage 
panel regression to deal with the endogeneity of analyst coverage.  Table 6 provides the 
results on examining the effect of analyst coverage on the informative role of income 
smoothing after allowing for the endogeneity of analyst coverage.  I also find that the 
coefficient on ANALYSTt_F*ISt *Xt3 is positive and significant (t-statistic = 2.47).  Thus, 
the results after considering the endogeneity still support the argument that income 
smoothing enhances earnings informativeness more greatly for firms with high analyst 
coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE         
 
5.       Conclusion 
           This study examines the effect of analyst coverage on the informativeness of 
income smoothing.  I find that income smoothing enhances earnings inoformativeness 
more greatly for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst 
coverage.  This study shows that analyst coverage affects the motivation for income 
smoothing.  My findings suggest that analyst coverage plays an important information 
intermediary role in enhancing the informativeness of income smoothing. 
           This study makes two contributions to the literature.  First, this study extends the 
research on analysts’ information discovery and interpretation roles.  I provide empirical 
evidence on the positive impact of analyst coverage on the extent to which income 
smoothing communicates private information.  Thus, this study can strengthen the 
argument of the positive (negative) effect of analysts’ information interpretation 
(discovery) role on the informativeness (opportunism) of income smoothing.  Second, 
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this study also adds to the research on the informativeness of earnings management (e.g., 
Subramanyam, 1996; Tucker & Zarowin, 2006).  Unlike prior research, I focus on the 
effect of analyst coverage on the informativeness of income smoothing.  This study 
implies that better information environment and corporate governance may lead to more 
informative earnings management.  
           This study also has its own limitations.  First, I use a variant of Jones model to 
measure discretionary accruals.  Although the Jones model is frequently used in the 
literature to compute discretionary accruals, it is likely that there are measurement errors 
in calculating discretionary accruals.  Second, allowing for the endogeneity of analyst 
coverage is also a concern on this study.  I use the past years’ analyst coverage as the 
instrumental variable to deal with the endogeneity of analyst coverage.  However, 
Larcker and Rusticus (2008) suggest that instrumental variable estimation may lead to 
loss in precision which may outweigh its benefit.  Third, the empirical analysis is based 
on the market efficiency assumption that information about future earnings is fully 
reflected in stock prices.  Like Tucker and Zarowin (2006), the results would be 
misinterpreted if stock prices are mispriced.  
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Table 1 
Sample breakdown by industry 
        
Two-Digit SIC Codes Industry Description Frequency Percent (%) 
13 Oil and gas extraction 186 3.93 
20 Food products 181 3.83 
26 Paper and allied products 117 2.47 
27 Printing and publishing 173 3.66 
28 Chemicals and allied products 486 10.27 
33 Primary metal 139 2.94 
34 Fabricated metal products 113 2.39 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 411 8.69 
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 506 10.70 
37 Transportation equipment 244 5.16 
38 Instruments and related products 287 6.07 
50 Durable goods 150 3.17 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 111 2.35 
58 Eating and drinking places 101 2.14 
59 Miscellaneous retail 119 2.52 
73 Business services 438 9.26 
Others   968 20.44 
Total 38 industries  4,730 100 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
             
Variable N Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
Rt 4,730 0.125 0.046 0.555 -0.208 0.332 
Xt-1 4,730 0.032 0.045 0.098 0.024 0.067 
Xt 4,730 0.036 0.047 0.088 0.022 0.071 
Xt3 4,730 0.147 0.152 0.250 0.053 0.249 
Rt3 4,730 0.463 0.262 1.053 -0.143 0.768 
BETAt 4,730 0.788 0.685 0.910 0.237 1.224 
ISt 4,730 0.578 0.610 0.276 0.354 0.816 
ANALYSTt 4,730 12.480 10.000 9.296 5.000 17.000 
BDINDt 4,730 0.613 0.625 0.185 0.500 0.750 
SIZEt 4,730 5,590.650 1,297.840 12,775.000 528.288 4,099.390 
BMt 4,730 0.656 0.339 0.960 0.169 0.720 
EARNSTDt 4,730 1.843 0.302 50.759 0.147 0.664 
LOSSt 4,730 0.154 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.000 
       
               Rt  = the ex-dividend stock return in year t, 
             Xt-1 = the split-adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items in year t-1, deflated by the  
                      stock price at the beginning of year t,  
             Xt   = the split-adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items in year t, deflated by the stock 
                      price at the beginning of year t,  
             Xt3  = the sum of split-adjusted earnings per share before extraordinary items in years t+1, t+2, and  
                      t+3, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of year t,  
             Rt3  = the annually compounded stock return for years t+1 through t+3, 
        BETAt = the slope coefficient of a regression of monthly stock returns on equally weighted market  
                      returns in year t, 
              ISt  = income smoothing,         
 ANALYSTt = analyst coverage, measured as the number of analysts who issued earnings forecasts, 
      BDINDt = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board, 
         SIZEt = firm size, measured as the market value of common equity (U.S. $ in millions),  
          BM
 t   = book-to-market ratio, measured as the ratio of book value of common equity to market value  
                      of common equity,  
EARNSTDt = future earnings variability, measured as the standard deviation of earnings per share adjusted  
                      for stock splits and stock dividends for years t+1 to t+3, deflated by the stock price at the  
                      beginning of year t,  
        LOSS
 t = dummy variable, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise.
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations 
(n=4,730) 
        
 
    
 
        
Variable  Xt Xt3 Rt3 BETAt ISt ANALYSTtt BDINDt SIZEt BMt EARNSTDt LOSSt  
Xt-1 0.47*** 0.19*** -0.06*** -0.21*** 0.19***   -0.01 -0.02 0.01    -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.30*** 
Xt  0.36*** -0.10*** -0.25*** 0.17*** -0.04** -0.05*** 0.01 -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.67*** 
Xt3   0.13*** -0.18*** 0.11*** -0.02 -0.07*** -0.03** 0.01 -0.33*** -0.31*** 
Rt3    0.00 -0.03* -0.06*** -0.01 -0.09*** 0.15*** -0.05*** 0.11*** 
BETAt     -0.12*** 0.03** -0.02 -0.09*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.28*** 
ISt      -0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.19*** 
ANALYSTtt       0.11*** 0.58*** -0.34*** 0.01 -0.03** 
BDINDt        0.11*** -0.04** 0.05*** 0.03** 
SIZEt         -0.28*** -0.03** -0.06*** 
BMt          0.13*** 0.19*** 
EARNSTDt                   0.15*** 
    
 
  
 
    
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 4 
Earnings informativeness and the informative role of income smoothing 
            
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -0.579 -1.90** -0.593 -1.94** 
Xt-1 - -0.998 -9.91*** -0.597 -3.66*** 
Xt + 1.882 15.43*** 1.330 6.04*** 
Xt3 + 0.578 11.51*** 0.308 3.00*** 
Rt3 - -0.071 -7.57*** -0.076 -4.18*** 
BETAt + 0.023 1.93** 0.021 1.83** 
ISt ?   -0.053 -0.94 
ISt *Xt-1 ?   -1.367 -3.41*** 
ISt *Xt ?   1.562 3.34*** 
ISt *Xt3 +   0.504 2.99*** 
ISt *Rt3 ?   0.009       0.30 
      
N        4,730            4,730 
# of Cross Sections                                             939       939 
Adj R2           29.36%       29.89% 
      
The panel regression model is model (2) for columns 3 and 4, and model (3) for columns 5 and 6.  
*** and ** denote significance at 1% and 5% levels, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 5 
Effect of analyst coverage on the informative role of income smoothing 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -1.433 -4.99*** 
Xt-1 - -0.536 -3.65*** 
Xt + 1.435 6.80*** 
Xt3 + 0.854 3.10*** 
Rt3 - -0.070 -4.34*** 
BETAt + 0.020 1.95** 
ISt ? 0.002 0.02 
ISt *Xt-1 ? -0.515 -1.43* 
ISt *Xt ? 1.507 3.60*** 
ISt *Xt3 ? -0.067                    -0.15 
ISt *Rt3 ? -0.051                        -1.82** 
ANALYSTt ? -0.010 -2.97*** 
ANALYSTt *ISt ? 0.001 0.34 
ANALYSTt*Xt3 ? -0.031                         -3.15*** 
ANALYSTt *ISt *Xt3 + 0.037                         2.35*** 
BDINDt ? -0.032 -0.21 
BDINDt *ISt ? 0.001 0.01 
BDINDt*Xt3 ? 0.231 0.58 
BDINDt *ISt *Xt3 + -0.458 -0.67 
SIZEt ? -0.000 -9.25*** 
SIZEt*Xt3 + -0.000 -0.03 
BMt ? 0.988 23.89*** 
BMt*Xt3 + -0.147                      -1.99** 
EARNSTDt ? 0.051  3.87*** 
EARNSTDt*Xt3 - -0.050  -1.91** 
LOSSt ? -0.109 -3.47*** 
LOSSt*Xt3 - -0.303 -3.61*** 
    
N                    4,730 
# of Cross Sections       939 
Adj R2                          45.84% 
    
The panel regression model is model (4).  
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 6 
Effect of analyst coverage on the informative role of income smoothing after allowing for 
endogeneity 
 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -1.694 -5.90*** 
Xt-1 - -0.582 -3.97*** 
Xt + 1.404 6.68*** 
Xt3 + 1.046 3.77*** 
Rt3 - -0.060 -3.73*** 
BETAt + 0.017 1.64* 
ISt ? 0.064 0.40 
ISt *Xt-1 ? -0.558 -1.55* 
ISt *Xt ? 1.623 3.88*** 
ISt *Xt3 ? -0.171                -0.38 
ISt *Rt3 ? -0.054                    -1.94** 
ANALYST_Ft ? 0.026   5.78*** 
ANALYST_Ft *ISt ? -0.006                  -1.09 
ANALYST_Ft*Xt3 ? -0.042                     -3.82*** 
ANALYST_Ft *ISt *Xt3 + 0.044                       2.47*** 
BDINDt ? -0.068 -0.45 
BDINDt *ISt ? 0.084 0.38 
BDINDt*Xt3 ? 0.280 0.70 
BDINDt *ISt *Xt3 + -0.517 -0.76 
SIZEt ? -0.000 -10.86*** 
SIZEt*Xt3 + -0.000 -0.29 
BMt ? 2.024 24.95*** 
BMt*Xt3 + -0.188                     -2.57*** 
EARNSTDt ? 0.043   3.28*** 
EARNSTDt*Xt3 - -0.056 -2.16** 
LOSSt ? -0.115 -3.65*** 
LOSSt*Xt3 - -0.284 -3.39*** 
    
N                    4,730 
# of Cross Sections                       939 
Adj R2                          45.67% 
    
The panel regression model is model (4), in which ANALYST is replaced with the fitted value of ANALYST 
(i.e., ANALYST_F) from model (5). 
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
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Appendix 
Results of the main test without having regression with fixed effects 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept ? -0.292 -3.01*** 
Xt-1 - -0.629 -4.70*** 
Xt + 1.197 6.31*** 
Xt3 + 1.006 4.16*** 
Rt3 - -0.066 -4.55*** 
BETAt + 0.031   3.33*** 
ISt ? -0.129 -0.97 
ISt *Xt-1 ? -0.905  -2.73*** 
ISt *Xt ? 1.577 4.11*** 
ISt *Xt3 ? -0.113                    -0.29 
ISt *Rt3 ? -0.042                      -1.64* 
ANALYSTt ? 0.001 0.44 
ANALYSTt *ISt ? 0.006 1.38* 
ANALYSTt*Xt3 ? -0.030                         -3.49*** 
ANALYSTt *ISt *Xt3 + 0.031                          2.28*** 
BDINDt ? -0.037 -0.30 
BDINDt *ISt ? 0.081 0.42 
BDINDt*Xt3 ? 0.084 0.24 
BDINDt *ISt *Xt3 + -0.193 -0.32 
SIZEt ? -0.000 -6.29*** 
SIZEt*Xt3 + 0.000   3.52*** 
BMt ? 0.696 21.01*** 
BMt*Xt3 + -0.120                       -1.86** 
EARNSTDt ? 0.034  3.14*** 
EARNSTDt*Xt3 - -0.105     -4.96*** 
LOSSt ? -0.092 -3.20*** 
LOSSt*Xt3 - -0.413 -5.47*** 
    
N                    4,730 
Adj R2                          26.13% 
    
***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed tests). 
 
